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Abstract 
Are Canadian travel advisories driven by a benign concern for the 
safety of Canadians, or are they driven by political motivations? To 
what extent are travel advisories administered by Canada linked to or 
guided by Canadian foreign policy? This paper comparatively assesses 
Canada’s willingness to impose travel advisories on states with which 
it has strong political relationships and those with which it has poor or 
weak political relationships. It surveys all Canadian advisories that 
deem there to be a “threat of terrorism,” representing a relatively 
constant risk variable in each state as measured by the Global 
Terrorism Index (GTI) (Institute for Economics & Peace [IEP] 2018). 
This study finds that Canada’s travel advisories fall into three 
categories: commensurate, incommensurate-erroneous, and 
incommensurate-politically motivated. Both types of incommensurate 
advisories are illustrated with the examples of Mauritania and the 
United States. Ultimately, Canada’s traveller information program 
lacks rigorous guidelines and creates opportunities for error or foreign 
policy influence. This results in inconsistent travel advisories that run 
the risk of misinforming Canadian travellers, deterring their travel or 
putting them at risk unwittingly. 
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In late-January 2018, the Government of Canada issued a travel 
advisory warning its citizens to “exercise a high degree of caution” 
when travelling to the Bahamas. Canada’s stated motivation for the 
advisory was an increased crime rate in the areas of Nassau and 
Freeport (Canada, 2018a). Indeed, the Inter-American Development 
Bank found violent crime rates in the Caribbean to be the highest in the 
world, with the Bahamas having the worst in the region (2017). In an 
apparent attempt to downplay concerns, the Bahamas government was 
quick to release a statement regarding the Canadian advisory, 
reassuring the Canadian government that it takes crime seriously and 
stressing the stability of the bilateral relationship (Bahamas, 2018). 
Within the Bahamas government, however, the response was far less 
tempered. Bahamas Tourism Minister, Dionisio D’Aguilar, defended 
the Bahamas as a safe destination for tourists, regardless of the reality 
that they have been targeted by violent crime (Adderley, 2018). He 
enthusiastically compared the safety of the Bahamas to that of London, 
Paris, and New York, adding, “But you know what we don’t have here? 
… I don’t have to worry about a terrorist! (Nobody is going to) come 
here and blow us up!” (ibid.).  
Impassioned responses to travel advisories are not without basis and 
are common among target states (states to which others have advised 
against travelling) (i.e. Luib, 2003, APAnews, 2016). Travel advisories 
have negative economic, political, and social effects on target states, 
which rationally seek to avoid their imposition. Political considerations 
are thus central to travel advisories. The question remains, however, to 
what extent the negative effects of advisories are regrettable or 
unintended by-products rather than intended outcomes of a state’s 
foreign policy. Aman Deep and Charles Samuel Johnston (2017) 
examine the range of political motivations that have the potential to 
drive the administration of travel advisories. For example, political 
expediency or bias may be operative when an administering state, met 
with equal risk in two countries, does not place advisories on friendly 
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states in the interest of good international relations but does place 
advisories on unfriendly or unallied states (Deep and Johnston, 2017, 
p. 87; Sharpley et al., 1996, p. 5). There is also potential for ideological 
hostility, where a travel advisory is motivated by ideological 
opposition to a target state’s government or leadership. Ultimately, if 
driven by foreign policy interests rather than a benign desire to secure 
the safety of citizens abroad, travel advisories can act as “tools of 
political coercion” (Deep and Johnston, 2017, p. 84) or “unofficial 
trade [embargoes]” (Sharpley et al., 1996, p. 4) meant to disrupt a 
target state’s economy, image, and international relations. 
The Government of Canada states that the primary goal of its travel 
advisories is to provide information to ensure the protection of 
Canadian citizens who are (planning to go) abroad (2018f). Canada’s 
implicit claim is that the negative ramifications of a travel advisory are 
justified by the risk present in the target state (Paquin, 2007, p. 210). 
Since Canada’s 2012 departure from the UN World Tourism 
Organization (UNWTO), prompted by the Organization’s recognition 
of Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe as a “global leader” for 
tourism (Davies, 2012), there has been no accountability or assessment 
of whether Canada’s travel advisories are justified by risk. Even before 
that, the reports of the international committee dedicated to the 
implementation and monitoring of UNWTO’s ethics code indicate that 
it pays no attention to the legitimacy of travel advisories issued by 
states (UNWTO, 2017). This leaves Canadian travel advice open to 
covert influence by the state’s foreign policy interests and provides the 
potential for them to be used as politically coercive foreign policy tools 
(Deep and Johnston, 2017, p. 84). This paper addresses this issue by 
asking the following interrelated questions: Are Canadian travel 
advisories driven by a benign concern for the safety of Canadians, or 
are they driven by political motivations? To what extent are travel 
advisories administered by Canada linked to or guided by Canadian 
foreign policy? To answer these questions, this paper will 
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comparatively assess Canada’s willingness to impose travel advisories 
on states with which it has strong political relationships and those with 
which it has poor or weak political relationships. These relationships 
will be defined by the presence of mutual membership in key alliances 
which are directly related to vital foreign policy interests, namely 
military security and economic wellbeing. Additionally, this paper will 
focus only on states in which a Canadian advisory deems there to be a 
“threat of terrorism,” representing a relatively constant risk variable in 
each state, as measured by the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) (Institute 
for Economics & Peace [IEP], 2018). This study finds that Canada’s 
travel advisories fall into three categories: commensurate, 
incommensurate-erroneous, and incommensurate-politically 
motivated. Both types of incommensurate advisories will be illustrated 
with the examples of Mauritania and the United States. Ultimately, 
Canada’s traveller information program lacks rigorous guidelines and 
creates opportunities for error or foreign policy influence, resulting in 
inconsistent travel advisories that run the risk of misinforming 
Canadian travellers, deterring their travel or putting them at risk 
unwittingly. 
The Impacts of Travel Advisories 
Travel advisories have the potential to trigger adverse outcomes for 
target states. Thus, the administration of an advisory carries with it 
political considerations. Understanding these ramifications is 
necessary to understanding how travel advisories have the potential to 
become “tools of political coercion” (Deep and Johnston, 2017, p. 84) 
that can further an administering state’s foreign policy interests. 
The foremost adverse outcome of travel advisories is economic harm, 
especially through the disruption of tourist flows and the industries 
which depend on them. These industries include air travel, travel 
service providers, hospitality, insurance, and a wide variety of local 
businesses that depend on tourist flows such as restaurants, 
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marketplaces, and venues. Conflict, instability, disease, and the like are 
all in themselves deterrents to tourism, sometimes exaggerated by 
dramatic media coverage (Deep and Johnston, 2017, p. 90; Henderson, 
2004, p. 19). Travel advisories compound and entrench these 
deterrents. Because official advice from the state is considered 
“authoritative,” it tends to further deter travel and investment abroad 
(Henderson, 2004, p. 19) and exacerbate existing problems in the target 
state through economic disruption (Mylonopolous et al., 2016, p. 2). 
Together, these elements have a lasting negative impact on the target 
state’s image and ability to attract international tourist flows and 
economic activity (Deep and Johnston, 2017, p. 93). 
In their seminal 1996 study, Richard Sharpley, Julia Sharpley, and 
John Adams implored administering states to be conscious of the 
negative effects of travel advisories, focusing on British and 
Scandinavian travel advisories regarding The Gambia. The Gambian 
economy was partially dependent on its tourism industry, which 
accounted for a tenth of national GDP and nearly 15 per cent of the 
state’s total employment (Sharpley et al., 1996, p. 2). A coup had 
startled policy-makers in Britain and Scandinavia, the group of 
countries that provided the lion’s share of tourists to The Gambia (ibid., 
p. 5), spurring them to administer travel advisories. They did this 
although the country remained, for the most part, politically stable. The 
advisories, however, made The Gambia much more susceptible to 
political, economic, and social instability by debilitating the economy 
rapidly (ibid., p. 3-4). Not only was the national tourism industry 
hollowed out, but every industry connected to or reliant on tourism, 
such as marketplace trade or transportation, was adversely affected 
(ibid., p. 3). 
Economic disruption can lead to domestic political instability, 
especially in more fragile states or states with economies that are 
partially dependent on tourism. Lower tax revenue from industries 
directly and indirectly benefitting from tourist flows reduces a 
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government’s budgetary stability (Deep and Johnston, 2017, p. 93). 
International politics are also affected by travel advisories. 
Internationally, advisories can disturb diplomatic stability between 
states, influencing both the target and administering state’s 
international relations (Henderson, 2004, p. 28). Beyond harming the 
bilateral diplomatic relationship between target and administrating 
states, the administering state may face pressure from its allies to place 
or not place an advisory in response to an event. Targeted states may 
seek to differentiate themselves and maintain a positive image in 
response to an advisory, affecting international relationships within a 
region. 
Following a 2002 terrorist attack in Bali, the governments of the United 
States, United Kingdom, and Australia imposed regional travel 
advisories across Southeast Asia (Henderson, 2004, p. 22). Canada 
joined them, raising its own advisory not long after (ibid.). Although 
they were in reaction to an event that occurred in a particular state, they 
were broad advisories that impacted all surrounding states, including 
Singapore, which was “renowned” for its relative stability (ibid., p. 
21). These advisories harmed the diplomatic ties between Singapore 
and its Western trading partners, causing outcry from the Singaporean 
government and from regional international organizations (Henderson, 
2004, p. 25). Furthermore, the states that raised advisories, especially 
Australia, were important sources of tourism for Singapore (ibid.). The 
advisories not only hurt Singapore’s international relations but 
destabilized its tourism industry and caused economic harm. The 
Singaporean government was compelled to allocate resources to 
convince tourists and the tourism sector that it was stable (ibid., p. 24), 
although Singapore was a safe state that had not experienced incidents 
or circumstances threatening the security of foreigners. 
Canada has also experienced the ramifications of travel advisories 
administered against it. In 2007, the World Health Organization placed 
a travel advisory on the Toronto area with the goal to control the spread 
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of SARS (Paquin, 2007). The advisory was challenged by critics, who 
claimed that it had been based on misinformation, and that the 
“benefits and burdens” of the advisory were not balanced (ibid., p. 
210). Indeed, the burdens were high. The advisory caused a loss to the 
economy of CAD$1.13 billion over the six days that it was imposed, 
while having questionable results as to the containment of SARS 
(ibid.). 
The ramifications of travel advisories span economics and politics, and 
have the potential to be significantly impactful on certain states or 
areas. This creates the opportunity for travel advisories to be used as 
instruments of foreign policy. States looking to punish others could 
target them with a travel advisory in order to cause economic harm or 
tarnish their international image without directly breaking any 
international laws. Because travel advisories are widely perceived by 
the international community as benign extensions of a state’s right to 
secure its citizen’s safety, their uses are not often scrutinized. In this 
way, a travel advisory can act as an “unofficial trade embargo,” 
effectively being a stealth sanction on a target state’s tourism industry 
(Sharpley et al., 1996, p. 4). States may also omit travel advisories in 
fear of retaliation from a more powerful or allied state. Regardless, 
political considerations are operative in the administration of any travel 
advisory, and even those which are justly administered to protect the 
safety of citizens have the potential to negatively affect the states which 
they target. 
Inconsistencies in Canada’s Traveller Information Program 
Canada has four travel advisory risk levels, which increase in severity 
(Canada, 2016). The first and lowest risk level is “Exercise normal 
security precautions,” which means that the target state has a 
comparable security situation to Canada, and that it is safe. The second 
risk level is “Exercise a high degree of caution,” which means that 
there are imminent security concerns, and that the situation in the target 
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state could deteriorate suddenly. The third risk level is “Avoid non-
essential travel,” which means that a specific threat exists, and that 
Canadians should only travel to the destination if they are familiar with 
the situation and need to be in the country. This risk level warns that 
security conditions could deteriorate and urges Canadians to “consider 
leaving while it is still safe to do so” (Canada, 2016). The fourth and 
highest risk level is “Avoid all travel,” which means that there is an 
extreme and existing threat to security. Any of these advisory levels 
can be joined by a regional advisory which applies to a specific 
location or region within a target state.  
The methodology of this section is as follows. First, all target states of 
Canadian travel advisories that cite “terrorism” as a risk were recorded 
and categorised based on the level of the advisory.1 Second, the GTI’s 
ranking of each state was recorded. The GTI scores most states on the 
globe based on “the relative impact of [terrorist] incidents” annually, 
ranking them in relation to each other (IEP, 2018, p. 83). The ranking 
and scoring of states is based on four relatively weighted factors: “total 
number of terrorist incidents in a given year; total number of fatalities 
caused by terrorists in a given year; total number of injuries caused by 
terrorists in a given year; [and] a measure of the total property damage 
from terrorist incidents in a given year” (ibid.). The greatest weight is 
given to fatalities (ibid.). These factors are further subjected to a 
weighted average over five years to “reflect the latent psychological 
effect of terrorist acts over time” (ibid.). The terrorism impact scores 
given to states by the GTI have been strongly correlated with a variety 
of other indicators, including internal and external conflict, displaced 
peoples, “overall level of peace,” political terror, public group 
grievances, religious violence, and “the risk of humanitarian crises” 
(IEP, 2017, p. 111). The GTI’s ranking and scoring system allows this 
                                                 
1Travel advisories were surveyed and recorded on 16 January 2019 (Canada, 
2018e). 
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study to measure the legitimacy of the claimed terrorism risk and the 
general safety risk in each travel advisory. Third, states that appear as 
logical anomalies (i.e. have a low terrorism impact score but a high 
travel advisory level) were individually assessed for other legitimizing 
factors. These could include aspects not captured by or correlated with 
the GTI score, such as environmental disaster, disease, or crime. 
Logical anomalies are often explained by these legitimizing factors and 
are otherwise commensurate. Fourth, target states whose advisories 
cannot be legitimized by some other factor were investigated based on 
Canada’s political relationship to determine the extent to which they 
are driven by foreign policy. 
This study finds that each of Canada’s travel advisories generally falls 
into one of three categories. The first is ‘commensurate,’ in that 
countries which are advised against have an ongoing and recent safety 
risk to Canadian citizens, and that the advisory is achieving its goal to 
inform Canadian travellers and is commensurate to the risk level. The 
second is ‘incommensurate-politically motivated.’ These are not 
justified by the present safety risk and their application or 
nonapplication is apparently driven by Canada’s foreign policy 
interests. The third advisory type is ‘incommensurate-erroneous,’ 
where the advisory is not justified by the present safety risk and there 
does not appear to be a discernable foreign policy interest that could 
influence the administration or withholding of an advisory. 
The following is an overview of how Canadian travel advisories 
correlate to the GTI. Extreme outliers have been noted where the 
advisory level does not appear to be commensurate to the terrorism 
impact score. Two of these outliers, Mauritania and the United States, 
are more closely examined below to illustrate the two different types 
of incommensurate travel advisories. States which have been targeted 
by “Avoid all travel” advisories with a claimed risk of terrorism all 
appear to be commensurate. There are no outliers among the group, as 
all are ranked highly in the GTI. States which have been targeted by 
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“Avoid non-essential travel” advisories also appear to be 
commensurate and justified by the risk of terrorism, except for Eritrea 
and Mauritania. While all other states rank among the top 40 in terms 
of terrorism impact, both rank at the very bottom of the GTI. States 
which have been targeted by “Exercise a high degree of caution” 
advisories present outliers on both sides. For example, France, China, 
the United Kingdom share quite similar terrorism impact scores to 
those with the lowest scores in the “Avoid all travel” category. This 
section also includes states which rank at the very bottom of the GTI 
with virtually no terrorism impact, including Guinea, Ghana, Trinidad 
and Tobago, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Cambodia, and Togo. The 
lowest level of advisory, “Exercise normal security precautions,” is 
meant to state that the traveller should expect the security situation to 
be similar to that of Canada’s (Canada, 2016). Canada sits at number 
57 on the GTI, with a score of 3.527. This is notably lower than some 
countries at this advisory level and much higher than others. For 
example, despite being at this advisory level the United States (20th), 
Germany (39th), and Greece (45th) have scores similar to those states 
which Canada explicitly warns citizens not to travel. 
Source: IEP, 2018, p. 79-80; Canada, 2018e. 
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These findings present two main groups of outliers. On one end, high 
advisories group Eritrea and Mauritania, which have no incidence of 
terrorism (and thus low correlates to terrorism), with states that top the 
GTI: Nigeria, Pakistan, and Egypt. On the other end, low advisories 
seem to underestimate the impact of terrorism in the United States, 
Germany, and Greece. The impact scores of these states are like those 
of Mali, Chad, and Burkina Faso, all of which are the targets of “Avoid 
all travel” and “Avoid non-essential travel” advisories. There are thus 
two extremes which can be examined in the scope of this paper: high-
level advisories that are administered against states with low GTI 
scores and low-level advisories that target states with relatively higher 
GTI scores. 
Source: IEP, 2018, p. 79-80; Canada, 2018e. 
In Eritrea’s case, the reasoning for the advisory appears to be 
commensurate. After being deemed the “region’s trouble-maker” in 
2003 (BBC News), border tensions with neighbouring states Djibouti, 
Ethiopia, and Sudan appear to have continued, with flare-ups in late-
2017 (Shaban, 2017). Although the advisory levels of Eritrea can be 
deemed commensurate, it remains true that terrorism has virtually no 
impact, and that it is misleading to include a portion of the advisory 
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dedicated to the threat of terrorism. The advisory against Mauritania is 
a different story. While the GTI found virtually no impact of terrorism 
in the state, Canada’s travel advisory warns, “Avoid non-essential 
travel to Mauritania due to the threat of terrorism, particularly against 
Western interests” (Canada, 2018b, emphasis added). Although reports 
regarding the potential for destabilization in Mauritania have expressed 
concern about the “growing radicalisation of Mauritanian youth,” they 
concurrently cite academic work stating the inactivity of terrorist 
organizations, the resistance to Islamist movements, and the lack of 
threat from Mauritanian Islamism (Rao, 2014, p. 8). Although al-
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb appeared to be a rising threat in the mid-
2000s, it has been concluded that its disorganization in Mauritania 
renders its capabilities “extremely limited” (ibid., p. 9). It has also been 
concluded that the government has effectively combatted 
radicalization and terrorism (ibid., p. 15-6). These realities are 
reflected by the GTI’s terrorism impact score for Mauritania, which is 
near zero. 
The question remains as to why Canada has an “Avoid non-essential 
travel” advisory targeting Mauritania that is explicitly about a high 
terrorism risk when no such risk is apparent. Canada’s political 
relationship to Mauritania is weak. According to the Embassy of 
Canada to Morocco and Mauritania, the bilateral political relationship 
is “limited but growing” (2018). This limited involvement includes 
cooperation in NATO’s Science for Peace and Security Program, 
through which Canada has helped fund and build a national crisis 
management centre meant to monitor for natural disasters and aid in 
their response (Pryce, 2016). It also includes limited financial support 
for counter-terrorism initiatives, and very limited support for human 
rights initiatives (Embassy of Canada to Morocco and Mauritania, 
2018). The crux of Canada’s relationship with Mauritania is 
commercial, especially in the mining sector, with trade totaling only 
CAD$14.9 million in 2016 (Embassy of Canada to Morocco and 
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Mauritania, 2018). This is a miniscule figure compared to Canada’s 
other trading partners (Statistics Canada, 2018b). 
Due to the weak bilateral relationship, it does not appear that Canada 
has a significant enough foreign policy interest in Mauritania to 
warrant the nefarious use of a travel advisory. Mauritania is not a 
significant international partner in security, trade, or any other major 
aspect of foreign policy. This advisory is incommensurate and 
erroneously applied, based on a non-existent terrorism threat and 
unmotivated by foreign policy. The most likely conclusion that can be 
surmised from Canada’s incommensurate advisory targeting 
Mauritania is that its administration is indicative of a traveller 
information program without sufficient guidelines or institutional 
frameworks, resulting in faulty advisories.  
The second group are low-advisory/high GTI states. The United States, 
Germany, and Greece are among these countries, all of which have 
“Exercise normal security precautions” advisories. This paper will 
focus on the United States, as it ranks highest on the GTI out of the 
identified outliers and has arguably the closest relationship to Canada. 
Source: IEP, 2018, p. 79-80; Canada, 2018e. 
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There are several statements within the United States travel advisory 
that seem to betray the low level of the advisory and deflate the reality 
of the risk. The advisory includes a generic terrorism warning found in 
many other advisories, which does not reflect the actual impact of 
terrorism in the country. The United States ranks 20th on the GTI, 
above states where terrorism is perceived to be a major threat, 
including Mali (“Avoid all travel” at 22nd) and Niger (“Avoid all 
travel” at 23rd), both of which have advisories due to an explicit 
terrorism risk (Canada, 2018d; Canada, 2018f; IEP, 2018, p. 79). This 
is not the only factor, however, that renders Canada’s travel advisory 
to the United States incommensurate. For example, the government of 
Canada claims that “the possession of firearms and the frequency of 
violent crime are generally more prevalent in the United States than in 
Canada” (Canada, 2019). The possession of firearms in the United 
States is far more prevalent than in Canada. In the United States, 89 
per cent of citizens own a firearm, while in Canada that number is 31 
per cent (Karp, 2011, p. 2). The United States has the largest number 
of firearms per citizen in the world, the runner-up having only 55 per 
cent ownership (ibid.). That country is Yemen (“Avoid all travel”) 
(ibid.). The United States homicide rate is more than double that of 
Canada’s (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], 
2015). This is higher than Burundi (“Avoid all travel”) and about the 
same as Kazakhstan, which has an “Exercise a high degree of caution” 
advisory due to crime (Canada, 2018c; UNODC, 2015). Furthermore, 
while Canada placed “Avoid all travel” and “Avoid non-essential 
travel” advisories on several Caribbean states due to Hurricane Irma in 
September 2017 (Canada, 2017b), it did not place a regional advisory 
against the southern United States, which was impacted heavily by the 
same storm (Pulver, 2018). Two regional advisories were placed 
against the United States in late August and early September 2018, one 
“Avoid all travel” advisory to Hawaii due to the danger posed by 
Hurricane Lane, and one “Avoid non-essential travel” to the Gulf 
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Coast area due to Tropical Storm Gordon. Both advisories were 
removed the day after they were posted, while reports did not indicate 
that the risk had decreased (Martin et al., 2018; Orjoux et al., 2018). 
Canada’s travel advisory to the United States is incommensurate. It 
does not accurately reflect the safety risk presented by relatively high 
firearm possession, violent crime rates, terrorism impact, and natural 
disaster. This can be explained by Canada’s strong political 
relationship with the United States. The two “enjoy the largest trading 
relationship in the world” (Canada, 2017a), institutionalized by one of 
the global economy’s most significant trade agreements, NAFTA (and 
its successor, the USMCA). Security relations between both countries 
are “longstanding and well entrenched” (ibid.) as partners in global and 
regional security organizations, such as NATO and NORAD. 
Furthermore, the United States is the highest recipient of Canadian 
overnight travellers by a large margin (Statistics Canada, 2017), and 
Canada the highest recipient of Americans (Statistics Canada, 2018a). 
Due to Canada’s close ties to the United States, as well as its security 
and economic dependence, it is counter the interests of foreign policy 
to administer an advisory against the United States. This would be the 
cause of diplomatic tension, economic harm, and destabilization in the 
various institutions upon which Canada depends. Canada’s restraint in 
administering a travel advisory against the United States is the result 
of foreign policy interests and political motivations. 
The United States and Mauritania were both identified as ‘outliers’ to 
the pattern of otherwise commensurate travel advisories. Their GTI 
scores contradict their advisory level, which is not justified by other 
factors. Mauritania has a very low terrorism impact score, and a high 
travel advisory due to a falsely perceived terrorism risk. Its travel 
advisory is incommensurate and erroneously applied. The United 
States has a high terrorism impact score and no active advisory, and 
other factors appear to warrant a higher advisory level. Other countries 
with a similar crime rate, for example, have travel advisories due to 
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crime, and other states with similar GTI scores (even closely allied 
ones such as the United Kingdom, which has an “Exercise a high 
degree of caution” advisory due to the risk of terrorism) have 
advisories due to an outstanding terrorism risk. Canada’s travel 
advisory to the United States is incommensurate and is kept low in the 
interest of foreign policy and the maintenance of political and 
economic relations. 
Conclusion 
Travel advisories have a negative impact on target states. These 
negative impacts should be justified by the safety risk to citizens from 
the administering state, but a lack of international oversight creates the 
possibility for states to use travel advisories to pursue foreign policy 
interests. This paper has investigated the extent to which Canada’s 
traveller information program is linked to or guided by foreign policy, 
finding that there are, broadly, three types of advisories administered 
by Canada. The first is commensurate. Most of Canada’s travel 
advisories fall into this category. However, there are two kinds of 
incommensurate Canadian travel advisories, reflecting inconsistency 
in Canada’s traveller information program: those which are erroneous, 
and those which are politically motivated and linked to foreign policy 
interests. Canada’s advisories to Mauritania and the United States are 
examples of these advisory types. These cases are not the only 
examples of incommensurate advisories that highlight inconsistency in 
Canada’s traveller information program. The travel advisories towards 
Mexico and Israel are patchworks of separate regional “Avoid all 
travel” and “Avoid non-essential travel” advisories, rather than blanket 
advisories applying to the entirety of each state. Both states have close 
political relationships with Canada – Mexico as a member of NAFTA 
and the USMCA and the second-highest recipient of Canadian 
travellers (Statistics Canada, 2017), and Israel as a state with which 
Canada has long-standing diplomatic ties. The lack of consistency in 
their advisories appears to be a hesitancy to apply blanket advisories 
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due to foreign policy interests. There are also countries which rank 
highly on the GTI but lack any mention of terrorism in their travel 
advisory, including South Sudan (14th), the Central African Republic 
(15th), and Myanmar (24th) (Canada, 2018e; IEP, 2018, p. 79). 
Both incommensurate advisory types, erroneous and politically 
motivated, are the result of a lack of due process in the Canadian 
traveller information program that renders them unjustified by existing 
risk. Former Global Affairs Canada spokesperson Jessica Séguin has 
admitted that there is no formula used to determine threat level 
(Dangerfield, 2017), and this ad-hoc process of gathering information 
on safety risks and posting or removing travel advisories creates 
opportunities for inconsistency and illegitimacy. Ultimately, the lack 
of institutionalization, formulae, guidelines, and rigour in Canada’s 
traveller information program either erroneously restricts the human 
right of Canadians to have the freedom of movement enshrined in both 
the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 13, 1948) and 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (s.6, 1982), or puts 
Canadian citizens abroad at risk in the service of foreign policy. The 
Government of Canada should pursue and institute a rigorous traveller 
information program, where advisories are posted and 
reduced/removed based on thorough, evidence-based risk assessment 
guidelines. To ensure a fully commensurate and just program, Canada 
should also rejoin the UNWTO and adopt its recommended practices, 
especially in regards to Article 6.5 of the Global Code of Ethics for 
Tourism, which while stressing the right of states to inform their 
citizens and ensure citizen safety, stipulates that such information 
should be unprejudiced, discussed with target states and relevant 
experts, “strictly proportionate” to the risk level, geographically 
confined to areas where risk is present, and “qualified or cancelled as 
soon as a return to normality permits” (UNWTO, 1999, p. 6). These 
actions would minimize the existing inconsistency in Canada’s 
traveller information program and lower or extinguish the number of 
Nicholas George Babey 
 
The Journal of Intelligence, Conflict, and Warfare 
Volume 2, Issue 1 
 
 
Page 18 
incommensurate travel advisories. Such is the best route to reduce any 
unnecessary harm to target states, and to meet the primary goal of 
Canada’s travel advisories: providing accurate information to ensure 
the protection of Canadian citizens abroad. 
The findings of this paper, while significant in their identification of a 
gap of oversight in an element of Canadian foreign policy, are 
ultimately limited by their breadth. As such, this paper can be 
understood as an element or introduction to a broader research agenda. 
To fully capture the extent of inconsistency in Canada’s traveller 
information program, further research would mirror the methodology 
herein with a wider range of traveller risk indicators, such as crime 
statistics, political stability indicators, natural disaster impacts, et 
cetera. Subsequent research would then assess the validity of a greater 
number of travel advisories, providing a fuller range of examples than 
are included here. This would allow for more definite conclusions, 
provide a fuller picture of Canada’s traveller information program and 
its inconsistencies, and solidify the recommendations given. 
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